Friday, January 28, 2011

Torley: Atheists Don't Know When Not to Kill

Yeah, as I have indicated before, the line between metaphysics and BS is often quite thin and tawny.

Uncommon Descent's resident philosopher, Vincent Torley, argues that Atheism cannot provide a sensible code of ethics because Atheism ain't metaphysical.

Let me say at the outset that I just might agree with Torley that Atheism "cannot provide a sensible code of ethics." Of course, I'm also not sure that theism, strictly speaking, can provide a sensible code of ethics either.

We are, after all, concerned only with the reasoned belief in, or the reasoned rejection of such belief, the existence of gods. By gods, I mean divine entities such as are named as objects of worship by believers in Western religious traditions.

I admit to being a hack philosopher, but it seems absurd to me to state that developing a sensible code of ethics has anything to do with the existence or non-existence of deities. I'll email Torley with a link to this post. Perhaps he'll explain.

On the other hand, "sensible" is, like beauty, in the eye of the beholder. For example, Christianity's fundamental principle of the inherent sin of human beings seems to me both absurd and baseless. Sensible or not, Christian ethics derive from the teaching of their holy books. Jewish ethics derive from their holy books. Ethics in Buddhism are based on the teachings of the Buddha.  Secular ethics tend to be based on accepting social contracts. Thus, there are plenty of moral philosophies for either the Atheist or theist to draw upon.

But Torley apparently thinks that people cannot make sense of ethical principles without a theory of reality, that is, without metaphysics:
Moral atheists need an ethical code to live by (don’t we all?), and the Golden Rule sounds like a pretty good place to start. But “Do unto others” makes no sense unless you know who the “others” are. To figure out that, you need metaphysics. This is modern atheism’s Achilles’ heel. You need metaphysics to tell you why it is wrong to kill someone in a coma, or for that matter, someone who’s sleeping. You need metaphysics to tell you why baby killing is murder. You need metaphysics to tell you why a killer should still be punished, even if he is arrested 20 years after his murderous act. Notions like “capacity,” “entity” (or “substance”) and “personal identity” are unavoidable in these contexts.

The problem with these metaphysical notions for a modern atheist is that from a materialistic standpoint, they lack justification. These notions are not supplied to us by the senses, and they cannot be scientifically validated. If the scientific method is your ultimate way of deciding what’s true, then you will have to discard most of the language we commonly use when talking about human beings (especially in an ethical context) as so much metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. But doing that leaves you with a paper-thin concept of what it means to be human. In everyday situations, a modern atheist will probably manage fine, but outside the realm of the normal, his/her ethics will go astray very quickly.
Unfortunately, I find Torley's argument above to be conceptually loose in some cases and just wrong in others. So much so, that it's hard to do anything more than shrug the shoulders and ask the philosopher to start again. But I'll give it a go now. Torley's statements are broken out and boldfaced.
Moral atheists need an ethical code to live by (don’t we all?).
Yes, we all live by an ethical code. Our every action, choice, and thought has an ethical dimension. In other words, to live is do ethics. As far as I can tell, "needing" an ethical code has nothing to do with atheism or theism. Rather, it has to do with being a conscious human agent, and in this sense we actually don't "need" an ethical code because we already have one. What Torley means in his statement, I think, is that we also need an external, culturally or socially-based set of rules that define virtuous and prohibited behavior. I agree that this type of externally imposed ethical code is a practical necessity.
“Do unto others” makes no sense unless you know who the “others” are.
This is patently false, but let's be clear about Torley's argument, which is that we have no reason to treat other people as we ourselves would like to be treated unless we know which beings on Earth qualify as other people. Thus, according to Torley's reasoning, if we know that women are not fully people, we have no obligation to treat them as we men would treat ourselves. If we think that black people or democrats are inferior to us, we have no reason to behave toward them as we would want to be treated ourselves.

So how is it that we learn who the “others” are? The same way learn what “do unto” means, by personal trial and error and by external social influences. I see no reason here not to follow the example of language acquisition: we are born hard-wired to acquire ethics, and we are taught the practice of ethical behavior through family and communal living.

Torley overvalues metaphysics, a subject that is poorly defined and may be impossible in any case. We can see this over-valuation by looking at two example statements:
Do unto flowers as you would have them do unto you.

Do unto cats as you would have them do unto you.
These are perhaps strange statements, yet they drive the point that in “Do unto others,” the operative consideration is how we ourselves wish to be treated. Thus, “Do unto others” can make functional sense even if one doesn’t know who the “others” are or what a flower or a cat is.
You need metaphysics to tell you why it is wrong to kill someone in a coma, or for that matter, someone who’s sleeping. You need metaphysics to tell you why baby killing is murder. You need metaphysics to tell you why a killer should still be punished, even if he is arrested 20 years after his murderous act. Notions like “capacity,” “entity” (or “substance”) and “personal identity” are unavoidable in these contexts.
In my understanding, metaphysics (whatever it is) is not so prescriptive as Torley seems to suggest. For example, why not murder someone in an coma? Because someone in a coma is still a person and people have intrinsic value (metaphysics), which therefore makes it wrong to kill that person and so dismiss their value (ethics). Rather, as a theory of reality metaphysics does not itself prescribe ethics but is used as a basis supporting for ethical arguments.

In addition, we need more than just metaphysics to understand why behavior X is wrong or right in a particular situation. We need epistemology, semantics, and psychology too. If we want to delve into arguments for why or why not kill entity Z--if that's the debate of the moment--many factors will come into play on all sides of the debate.

I am not denying that people and philosophers use or even need metaphysics, but I think we need to talk about metaphysics in context.
The problem with these metaphysical notions for a modern atheist is that from a materialistic standpoint, they lack justification. These notions are not supplied to us by the senses, and they cannot be scientifically validated.
Let's assume Torley is correct. Notions like "capacity" and "personal identity" cannot be scientifically validated. Why would this be a problem? Why would rejecting the idea that gods exist preclude accepting terms of evaluation and distinction?

What Torley doesn't seem to understand is that Atheists by and large are comfortable with concepts that lack scientific validation. We can talk about, say, the "worth of a human life" without embarrassment. Yet, we're also unafraid to recognize that we're dealing with subjective terms and levels of personal comfort. We're not dealing with absolutes--subjective terms, in my understanding, are by definition not absolute--and we're not dealing with dogma.

My point is that Atheists have metaphysics, just like everyone else. We all have, like it or not, a theory of reality. Like with ethics, to live as a sentient being is to develop a theory of reality.

But notice above that Torley shifts his argument to be not so much anti-Atheist as contra-materialism. I don't think it's true that from the materialist standpoint, abstract terms such as "personal identity" lack justification. Rather, a sense of "personal identity" receives justification from whatever human attributes or properties one associates with an individual human being. It's a category that eventually ties down to the material.

The materialist caution on an idea such as personal identity is very simple: don't mystify it. Don't make personal identity mysterious and "undefinable," willy-nilly. Simply throwing one's hands up and saying "I am more than just my body and more than my body and mind!"--well, this is unjustified unless we can formulate a reasonable definition of "more."
If the scientific method is your ultimate way of deciding what’s true, then you will have to discard most of the language we commonly use when talking about human beings (especially in an ethical context) as so much metaphysical mumbo-jumbo. But doing that leaves you with a paper-thin concept of what it means to be human.
See my comment to the bit just above.
In everyday situations, a modern atheist will probably manage fine, but outside the realm of the normal, his/her ethics will go astray very quickly.
Uh, okay.

I realize that the links above do not serve to counter Torley's point, which is that "outside the realm of the normal," the ethics of the Atheist will "go astray." But I don't think Torley has much of a point to which to respond! I mean, what exactly is "the realm of the normal"? What is "astray"?

Through these links, I am making the only real point that can be made: even religious authorities, people who should definitely be in firm possession of the "sensible code of ethics" that Atheists must lack (according to Torley), go "astray" all the time. I'd wager that Atheist and theist populations "go astray," whatever that means, with fairly equivalent frequency. If so, then what are we really talking about here?

8 comments:

  1. "In my understanding, metaphysics (whatever it is) is not so prescriptive as Torley seems to suggest...In addition, we need more than just metaphysics to understand why behavior X is wrong or right in a particular situation."

    He says it is necessary, not sufficient.

    "...people have intrinsic value (metaphysics)..."

    So some claim, yet I have not seen this well demonstrated.

    "...both sides of the debate."

    What a disgusting turn of phrase. As if the best way to distinguish in a debate were the prospective tentative prior conclusions of its participants.

    "Atheists by and large are comfortable with concepts that lack scientific validation."

    Who cares?

    "Yet, we're also unafraid to recognize that we're dealing with subjective terms and levels of personal comfort. We're not dealing with absolutes..."

    Just because something is subjective does not mean it isn't absolute/objective.

    "The problem with these metaphysical notions for a modern atheist is that from a materialistic standpoint, they lack justification. These notions are not supplied to us by the senses, and they cannot be scientifically validated...If the scientific method is your ultimate way of deciding what’s true, then you will have to discard most of the language we commonly use when talking about human beings (especially in an ethical context) as so much metaphysical mumbo-jumbo."

    Inability to solve a problem (or recognize that others have solved it) does not mean it is unsolvable. In any case, reasonable people believe what it is reasonable to believe, not just what has scientific support.

    "Uh, okay."

    If Atheist, then astray.

    Disprove by finding someone who is not astray, yet not not an atheist.

    Finding non Atheists who are astray disproves "If not atheist, not astray".

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  2. Hi Brian,

    "He says it is necessary, not sufficient."

    Does anything I say contradict your point?

    "What a disgusting turn of phrase. As if the best way to distinguish in a debate were the prospective tentative prior conclusions of its participants."

    Sorry not to be more delicate. What makes you think I trying to offer a "best way"?

    "Who cares?"

    I do. I think Torley does.

    "Just because something is subjective does not mean it isn't absolute/objective."

    If you say so.

    "Disprove by finding someone who is not astray, yet not not an atheist."

    My children.

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  3. "You need metaphysics" (repeated over and over).

    ...we need more than just metaphysics...

    Your point fails to address what you are responding to but there's nothing false about it.

    "What makes you think I trying to offer a "best way"?"

    It's possible you didn't think saying that way was ideal or even good and used it anyway. As it is unbelievable when people who crash into telephone poles claim they "meant to do that", I think it likely you are endorsing the near implications someone who chose that phrase would mean, or you failed to think through those implications. I should soften my claim to being that this was probably what you thought was the best that you had thought of and that it is good enough. It's not good enough and you probably thought of better or should have thought of better.

    "I think Torley does."

    I think it is most likely that his argument is concerned with the possibility of moral atheism, as suggested in phrases such as "Let’s assume for argument’s sake that atheists are eventually able to agree on a metaphysical system".

    "If you say so."

    In my room is a perfect 1:50 scale model of my room. It maps out everything in my room.

    Is the model a thing modeling, or a thing modeled?

    In any case, proving something is subjective does not prove it isn't objective without demonstrating that subjective things can't be objective any more than proving something is 20 pounds proves it isn't wood without demonstrating that wood things can't be 20 pounds does. The burden of proof is not on me.

    "My children"

    Lo! Apparently your conclusion was true, though your implicit argument was invalid.

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  4. Hi Larry,

    Thanks for giving me the opportunity to respond on your blog. I'll try to address what I perceive as your most important points.

    1. You write that "it seems absurd to me to state that developing a sensible code of ethics has anything to do with the existence or non-existence of deities."

    If we're talking about a pint-sized Zeusian deity, I'd agree. If we're talking about a personal Being who maintains the universe in existence, I'd disagree. My position on the relation of theism to ethics is described here:

    http://www.angelfire.com/
    linux/vjtorley/
    whybelieve1.html#god-conscience

    Please note that I believe atheists can (in principle) figure out the precepts of natural law without explicitly assuming the existence of a deity, so long as they refrain from explicitly assuming that God does not exist in their ethical deliberations. In practice, however, most atheists' explicit assumption at the outset that there is no deity tends to skewer their metaphysics, and their ethics as well. Professor Singer is an excellent example: he has a very logical mind, but he is unable to recognize the case for regarding a newborn baby as having human rights, because of his flawed metaphysics.

    2. Regarding your comments on the need for an ethical code: I agree that atheists and theists alike need one, as a practical necessity. Hence my side-comment: "don't we all?"

    3. I wrote that "Do unto others" makes no sense unless you know who the "others" are. You think this is patently false, as can figure out who the others are by trial and error. But that only works for sentient others, and especially others who are sapient and can object to being mistreated - which is why racism is obviously wrong. It doesn't work for people in comas. Nor does it work for embryos.

    4. Regarding the coma case, you rightly point out that we need more than just metaphysics to decide what's right and wrong. I agree. My point was that metaphysics is necessary, not that it is sufficient. If we are agreed that killing persons is wrong, and I can show that someone in a coma is still a person, then it follows that killing someone in a coma is wrong. But the demonstration that someone in a coma is still a person is not a trivial one. What about someone who's cryogenically frozen, like Ripley in "Alien 3"? What about a frozen embryo? Here, metaphysics can perform a valuable service to ethics. I'll write more about this in my next post.

    5. Why are atheists likely to do badly at metaphysics? Not because of their atheism as such, but because of their materialism, which tends to devalue terms like "capacity," "form" and "person." If I were arguing with a disciple of Ayn Rand, for instance, we would at least share a lot of metaphysical assumptions which would make it easier to agree on certain points, even if we disagreed about others.

    I'll write more later. Thanks for allowing me to reply.

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  5. "Your point fails to address what you are responding"

    I disagree. I accept the basic premise but think it's not giving a full picture. My address might fail, but I do try to make an address.

    "It's possible you didn't think saying that way was ideal or even good and used it anyway."

    I'm trying to match the spirit of Torley's comment. The killing of the comatose and the sleeping comes from him. My point is basically that more than just strictly metaphysical issues are involved and at stake.

    I don't doubt that I could probably use better phrasing or a better illustration. If you have a suggestion, please provide it.

    "I think it is most likely that his argument is concerned with the possibility of moral atheism, as suggested in phrases such as "Let’s assume for argument’s sake that atheists are eventually able to agree on a metaphysical system"."

    I agree with you, except that he's quite plain that he doesn't think it is possible. My question, as I suggest at the beginning, is whether moral theism is possible.

    "proving something is subjective does not prove it isn't objective without demonstrating that subjective things can't be objective any more than proving something is 20 pounds proves it isn't wood without demonstrating that wood things can't be 20 pounds does. The burden of proof is not on me."

    Point taken. I'll need to revise. As usual, I'll take specific revision suggestions when I can get them. After all, I think we want thing to be as clearly and fairly reasoned as possible.

    "Apparently your conclusion was true, though your implicit argument was invalid."

    Could be. I said I was a philosophical hack. I hope to get the hang of it someday. I beg your patience.

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  6. Vincent,

    Thanks for the response. I genuinely appreciate it.

    A question. Is it disingenuous to talk of the "the relation of theism to ethics" when you seem to mean only the god of Christian beliefs? We both know well that Christian theisms are not the only ones. What are your processes for ensuring that you are not succumbing to bias in favor of Christianity, or in favor of your preferred strand of Christianity?

    Another question: Which philosophers do you find to be the most effective proponents of the "materialism" you oppose?

    Again, thanks for the reply.

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  7. "3. I wrote that "Do unto others" makes no sense unless you know who the "others" are. You think this is patently false, as can figure out who the others are by trial and error. But that only works for sentient others, and especially others who are sapient and can object to being mistreated - which is why racism is obviously wrong. It doesn't work for people in comas. Nor does it work for embryos."

    So when you say "makes no sense", all you mean is "is not practically achievable", even though it is conceptually cogent?

    True knowledge generally helps anyone do better at solving the practical side. Knowing that certain fetuses are not viable out of the womb, or certain prisoners would certainly be recidivists, or certain airplane safety standards would push people to more dangerous transportation, etc. is all practically helpful. So too would be any knowledge that a soul exists for some beings but not others, etc.

    However, that's not a very interesting claim. "We disagree about the world as it is, i.e. we have different metaphysics (no one lacks a metaphysical model, however sparsely populated its space or contradictory its components). We agree that moral functioning depends on understanding the world as it is. Our disagreement about which metaphysical claims are true is reflected in moral prescriptions."

    The fact that it is easier to derive which action is truly moral under most religious system assuming they are true as against most non-religious systems assuming they are true is derivative of a more fundamental disagreement and adds nothing to it.

    The superiority of some metaphysical systems in converting beliefs about the world into prescriptive actions is not an argument for their truth, and the fact that in general religious systems are more actionable than non-religious or atheistic ones in general is especially unimportant because it is a mere tendency.

    The most directive metaphysical system would contain entities such that to do good would be to act on the first thought that arises. In that case, it would be easy to know what to do! Or perhaps even easier, ones that make whatever one actually does good!

    To the extent that the discussion of morality depends on the discussion of metaphysical reality, the moral discussion is not one worth having. I don't see how anything you say here implies that a discussion of metaphysical reality depends on a discussion of morality, which would justify having it.

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  8. "...both sides of the debate."

    "Sorry not to be more delicate...I don't doubt that I could probably use better phrasing or a better illustration. If you have a suggestion, please provide it."


    "The essence of the liberal outlook lies not in what opinions are held but in how they are held: instead of being held dogmatically, they are held tentatively, and with a consciousness that new evidence may at any moment lead to their abandonment. This is the way opinions are held in science, as opposed to the way in which they are held in theology."
    -Bertrand Russell

    I simply object to describing the debate about killing entity Z as one between two sides: those who have reached different conclusions. A debate is among multiple groups which share evidence and try to determine how reality is best described and acted upon. I inferred from the word "both" that you were dividing people based on their conclusions, because surely you know that there are more than two ways of thinking. Perhaps too casuistic on my part.

    So I suggest replacing "both" with "all" which somewhat implies you aren't grouping people by their conclusions (of which there are only two) about whether or not to kill entity Z. Even though it would be possible you meant to include the range of (technically not killing) options between not killing and killing, it would be possible you didn't mean that and charity would prevent me from reading it that way.

    "I agree with you, except that he's quite plain that he doesn't think it is possible. My question, as I suggest at the beginning, is whether moral theism is possible."

    It seems to me not that he thinks it impossible, but rather impractical. Accurately knowing how to treat people would depend on fortuitously using divine intuition as a guide sometimes, and using cold logic at other times, for which only a religious metaphysics will have real success at if any of a set of metaphysical claims are true (and he thinks that a subset of such are).

    ReplyDelete

Feel free to comment if you have something substantial and substantiated to say.