Friday, September 03, 2010

Are Divine-Human Interactions Possible?

[I'm pulled into ever more minutia-discussions on Kuzari]

This is more fallout from the continuing email exchange I have been having with Rabbi Dovid Gottlieb concerning my post on the Kuzari Principle. I have argued that Gottlieb needs to do a better job of establishing the possibility that divine-human interactions take place. Gottlieb disagrees.

Originally, I had asked him “Why do we think that it even makes sense to conceive of immortal, super-beings?” I asked this question because he began his syllogism explaining Kuzari on the premise, "Let E be a possible event...." The word "possible" is Gottlieb's, not mine. For the Sinai revelation to work as E, a possible event, the God of Exodus must exist and that God must be able to make himself perceptible to people.

Now, we can think of other conditions that must be possible before Sinai can be possible, but I want to stop with the two conditions I just stated. I had originally asked Gottlieb about the first condition, reasons for thinking God exists, but here I want to spend time considering the second condition, reasons for thinking that God and humans can have actual interactions with each other.

At first, Gottlieb avoided answering my question by misconstruing my request as a demand that he "prove" the possibility of such an event. But, no, I had asked that he establish the possibility, not prove it.

I suspect Gottlieb knows it is no simple matter to establish the possibility that divine beings communicate and interact with real humans. To illustrate, let’s claim that “It’s possible that divine being DB has shaken hands with Fred.” Compare this claim with four others:
(1) “It’s possible that human being HB has shaken hands with Fred.”
(2) “It’s possible that grizzly bear GB has shaken hands with Fred.”
(3) “It’s possible that the color green has shaken hands with Fred.”
(4) “It’s possible that imaginary character IC has shaken hands with Fred.”
Do we allow that all five claims are equally possible? Or do we balk and suggest that the degree of possibility will be influenced by (a) conditions such as historical time, geographical space, and available technology; (b) our prior knowledge and assumptions about the kinds of entities named as divine, human, grizzly bear, color, and imaginary; and (c) our understanding of the speaking intent of the claimants and the modality of the claims [e.g., persuasive or entertainment intent; factual or figurative mode]?

Using these three criteria, we can propose reasonable standards of impossibility:
Claim (1) will be impossible if HB and Fred don’t live at the same time and never come across one another.
Claim (2) will be impossible for the same reason as claim (1).
Claim (3) will be impossible if the claim is intended as a straightforward, factual statement.
Claim (4) will be impossible if the claim is intended as a straightforward, factual statement and Fred refers to a real human being.
But what makes the divine-human interaction claim impossible? Well, for one thing we cannot use the question of the divinities’ existence or non-existence because the claim already presupposes existence and because we want to separate the category “divinity” from the category of “imaginary character IC.” Nothing seems to make the claim impossible.

Before the religious among us rejoice too much, I remind everyone that we can achieve an equally possible and also-unfalsifiable result by using the name of any divinity or mythical being: divine-human interaction, God-human interaction, mermaid-human interaction, Ra-human interaction, Odin-human interaction, centaur-human interaction, and so on. These types of interaction are all possible and all unfalsifiable.

I had asked Gottlieb “Why do we think that it even makes sense to conceive of immortal, super-beings?” I could now just as well ask “Why do we think that it makes sense to conceive of mermaids and centaurs?” At one time, good reasons may have included explanation, fun, or for sake of tradition. Today, however, the questions are whether these reasons still hold and whether other conceptions offer better reasons.

The larger point is that  
We do not automatically grant the existence of gods--we do not and we should not. Anyone who wants to place "God" in the context of reality will have to address the questions of why posit a god at all and why posit this or that version of a god.

To put the point another way: It is becoming ever less necessary to take seriously the supernatural substance of religions.

7 comments:

  1. Anonymous9:33 AM

    I'm so happy you are taking him on. Yasher Koach to you.

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  2. I'm not sure what it matters whether or not you personally automatically grant the existence of God to discuss the issue with those of us that do.

    This whole post seems pretty circular to me. Before we consider the possibility that God exists, we have to consider the possibility that it's possible for God to communicate with us. But before we consider that it is possible for God to communicate with us, we have to consider that God's existence might not be possible.

    As for the comparison to unicorns and mermaids, what of it? You don't think that it's concievable that a god could create a world with creatures with an extremely rich intellectual life, with imaginary beings as part of that intellectual life. Furthermore, our reasoning for believing in God vs. those other things (which we don't believe in) are different. With one, we have the near universal traditions of the world over for at least the general belief that there is something beyond or transcending the natural visable order even if we have further disagreements into the specifics of the transcendent other. Those other things you mention are far more local.

    We have a wealth of reports even today of people who have contact with God, which of course atheists will insulate themselves against by saying all such reports are deluded or false (or they'll bring out the ole self defeating claim of "we don't have scientific proof," of which is a good standard for much knowledge, but very poor and self defeating as a universal expectation for all knowledge).

    This is where your thinking becomes most circular. We're supposed to figure out if the existence of God is possible before we figure out if contact with God is possible. Problem is, our conceptions of what is possible is and ought to be fed by our experiences. Clearly, if one experiences it, it is certainly possible. But you think it all should be done a priori. If we thought that way about everything, science would never progress.

    Furthermore, your other entities don't have the same existential significance for our lives, for hunman significance and worth, for morality, for the importance of community, for the significance of beauty in the world, and so on.

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  3. "Before we consider the possibility that God exists..."

    There is no "before." Start by considering the possibility that gods exist. Why should we think it's even possible they do?

    Look at what you say: "You don't think that it's concievable that a god could create a world...."

    Forget about what kind of world a god could create. Start first with where this god came from. Again, why should we think it's even possible a god or this god exists?

    "We have a wealth of reports even today of people who have contact with God...."

    Do we, now? How do we substantiate these? How do we distinguish between genuine divine-human interactions from illusions, delusions, figurative speaking, lying, and other falsities?

    "our conceptions of what is possible is and ought to be fed by our experiences."

    Bull. In many sciences our conceptions of what's possible far exceeds our experiences, perceptions, and imaginations. Think of the many dimensions of string theory or the multiverses in cosmology.


    "your other entities don't have the same existential significance for our lives."

    This, again, is bull.

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  4. Forget about what kind of world a god could create.



    To do so just wouldn't be doing the concept of God justice considering God as creator is essential to what it is that we are pondering to begin with. Your suggestion just seems half measures to me.

    Do we, now? How do we substantiate these?

    For one, by knowing the kind of people that make these claims. And secondly, by giving up the very defunct idea that some uncertainty, some risk of being wrong is inconsistent with knowledge. If it is, then we can't know anything.

    Bull. In many sciences our conceptions of what's possible far exceeds our experiences, perceptions, and imaginations.

    I don't know why you'd want to suggest a universal where it just doesn't exist. In science, what was thought impossible is often demonstrated otherwise by empirical data. And sometimes there is something wrong with the empirical data and our previous scientific principals do indeed turn out to be a guide.


    "your other entities don't have the same existential significance for our lives."

    This, again, is bull.


    Well, you can demonatrate that if you'd like. I have no reason to believe on the basis of your claim alone though when it contradicts so much that I know.

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  5. "To do so just wouldn't be doing the concept of God justice."

    But that's the point. To do the concept justice, you might want to see about showing that it refers to something real. Of course, no such show has been made so far, and the more we know about the universe and the cultural world, the more it seems that no such show ever will be made. I am suggesting, then, that before we hear any arguments about what a god could do, let's put in some work on how we know there is such a thing. Why are you evading this critical work?

    "by knowing the kind of people that make these claims."

    I don't understand. Do you mean that if they are "Good Fellas" then I should automatically believe them no matter what they claim?

    "by giving up the very defunct idea that some uncertainty, some risk of being wrong is inconsistent with knowledge."

    I am very comfortable with uncertainty as a part of knowing, as this is part of intellectual honesty. It seems to me that many religions have a serious problem with uncertainty, hence the frequent lunges at how there "must be" a god and how this or that god must be a god "as creator."

    I don't know what you're trying to say in the rest of your comment, including the plea that your concept of gods is so important that your personal version must be true for all the universe and all time.

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  6. What God is like and how he relates to the world is more basic than whether he exists. After all, you cannot investigate the existence of something about which you know absolutely nothing. Your requirement is just odd, there is no reason to think it is necessary and very far from required by any rule of logic.



    I don't understand. Do you mean that if they are "Good Fellas" then I should automatically believe them no matter what they claim?


    Why would you think I promote that they'd be believed no matter what? Certainly not. But do such people provide reasonable and in some cases even excellent evidence? Do they contribute to a greater cummulative case that makes many other considerations? Absolulely. To discard vast and numerous experiences as all deluded or dishonest is truly the insular approach.

    I am very comfortable with uncertainty as a part of knowing, as this is part of intellectual honesty. It seems to me that many religions have a serious problem with uncertainty,

    So we aren't equivocating here, the lack of certainty of which i speak is not a lack of confidence. It is the lack of absolute proof. So knowledge with some uncertainty, ie confidence in spite of epistemic risk, ie FAITH is an explicit part of some religions, such as Christianity. So no, we aren't the one's with the problem.

    I don't know what you're trying to say in the rest of your comment, including the plea that your concept of gods is so important that your personal version must be true for all the universe and all time.

    You compared God to mythical creatures. We have reasons for believing in God for which we don't have for those mythical creatures. God provides excellent explanatory power for much of that which gives life significance. But we've been over that before a few months ago. I didn't see the need to repeat myself in detail.

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  7. "you cannot investigate the existence of something about which you know absolutely nothing."

    True, but the concept refers to something, not nothing. At the most basic level, the concept refers to a supernatural being. My question is how we describe the possibility of such beings. Are they possible simply because we conceive of them? Are they possible in the sense of existing in dimensions other than the four we know for ourselves? I don't think it's really that hard of a question.

    "To discard vast and numerous experiences as all deluded or dishonest is truly the insular approach."

    I've said nothing of discarding such experiences. Tell me, though, how we might discriminate between reliable testimony, delusion, dshonesty, and the like. It still seems like you propose that some people have an inherent entitlement to be believed without scrutinizing their stories or claims.

    "So we aren't equivocating here, the lack of certainty of which i speak is not a lack of confidence. It is the lack of absolute proof. So knowledge with some uncertainty, ie confidence in spite of epistemic risk, ie FAITH is an explicit part of some religions, such as Christianity. So no, we aren't the one's with the problem."

    First you separate certainty and confidence, and then you align them with that "i.e." Am I wrong to assert that your knowledge is almost completely subjective? My knowledge--at least in the area we are discussing--is based on empirical data and embraces uncertainty. Your knowledge is surely more nebulous and uncertain yet it typically couched in terms of conviction and certainty.

    "You compared God to mythical creatures. We have reasons for believing in God for which we don't have for those mythical creatures."

    No, I don't think you have any extra reasons for believing in gods. You're just more comfortable accepting the mythincal status of the other creatures.

    "God provides excellent explanatory power for much of that which gives life significance."

    Not really, because "God" is meaningless. You might as well say "Nature" or "The Universe." These explanations suck at the level of real details, as I have shown and many, many others have too.

    "I didn't see the need to repeat myself in detail."

    You rarely give details, as far as I can tell.

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Feel free to comment if you have something substantial and substantiated to say.